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EVEN WHEN YOU WIN, YOU LOSE: EXECUTIVE ORDER 13769
& THE DEPRESSING STATE OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
IN THE CONTEXT OF IMMIGRATION
Amy L. Moore*
INTRODUCTION
On January 27, 2017, the new President signed an Executive Order imposing
severe restrictions on immigration into the United States.1 Overnight, nationals and
refugees from seven countries could no longer enter into the United States even with
documentation and vetting that had previously been approved.2 The State of Wash-
ington filed a complaint in the United States District Court in the Western District
of Washington seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against President Trump, the
United States Department of Homeland Security and its Secretary, the Secretary of
State, and the United States of America.3 On February 1, 2017, the State of Minnesota
was added as a plaintiff.4 The States wanted the court to invalidate parts of the order
and enjoin its enforcement.5 The States then sought a temporary restraining order
(TRO) to prevent enforcement of the order while waiting for a hearing to determine if
a preliminary injunction should be issued.6 The District Court granted the TRO nation-
wide.7 The government responded by filing an emergency motion to stay the order
pending an appeal.8 This motion was quickly heard by the Ninth Circuit, which ruled
against a stay and allowed the executive order to be enjoined.9 Ultimately, the Ninth
Circuit denied reconsideration of the matter en banc and dismissed the case when
a subsequent Executive Order was issued on March 6, 2017, that rendered the initial
order moot.10
* Professor of Law at Belmont University. Special thanks to Tyler Sanders for his swift
and helpful research input, and Amber Seymour for her gracious editing.
1 Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
2 See generally Washington v. Trump (Washington I), No. 2:17-cv-00141-JLR (W.D. Wash.
Feb. 3, 2017) (temporary restraining order); Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977.




7 Id. at *5–6.
8 See generally Emergency Motion Under Circuit Rule 27-3 for Administrative Stay &
Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (No.
17-35105).
9 Washington v. Trump (Washington II ), 847 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017) (per
curiam) (order denying stay of District Court’s TRO).
10 Washington v. Trump (Washington III ), 858 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017) (order denying
vacatur of stay order).
65
66 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:65
In ruling on the propriety of the TRO and the likelihood of the States’ case re-
garding the merits, the Ninth Circuit, in its first order, held that the Executive Order
might be invalidated for a lack of procedural due process.11 This Article evaluates
that claim via the storied history of procedural due process in the immigration con-
text and concludes that even if procedural due process could be applied to all aliens
implicated by the original Executive Order, it would not have been the victory
expected by its advocates.
I. HISTORY OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN IMMIGRATION LAW
When initially undertaking a study of immigration law in the United States, a
primary principle that emerges is Congress’s fundamental power over that area.
Although it may be unclear from whence constitutionally Congress’s power exactly
materializes,12 the Supreme Court as early as 1889 began its analysis in Chae Chan
Ping v. United States13 by saying, “[t]hat the government of the United States,
through the action of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory
is a proposition which we do not think [is] open to controversy.”14 This case in-
volved the exclusion of Chinese laborers who had to prove they had been in the
United States before the ban against Chinese immigration had been put into effect.15
To support this broad proclamation of existing power, the Court stated,
The government, possessing the powers which are to be exer-
cised for protection and security, is clothed with authority to
determine the occasion on which the powers shall be called
forth; and its determination[s], so far as the subjects affected are
concerned, are necessarily conclusive upon all its departments
and officers.16
The power of exclusion was, somehow, merely incident to sovereignty and belonged
clearly to the government of the United States.17 However, this power extended not
11 Washington II, 847 F.3d at 1164–65.
12 See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS
AND POLICY 813–14 (7th ed. 2012) (discussing Congress’s role in asylum applications); see
also Anne E. Pettit, “One Manner of Law”: The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis and the Immi-
gration Law Plenary Power Doctrine, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 165, 169 (1996).
13 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
14 Id. at 603. Alien migration into the United States was unrestricted until 1875, and the
first general immigration statute was passed in 1882. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,
761 (1972).
15 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582.
16 Id. at 606.
17 Id.
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only to exclusion, but also to expulsion or deportation of “all aliens, or any class of
aliens, absolutely or upon certain conditions, in war or in peace, [as] an inherent and
inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation, essential to its safety,
its independence and its welfare.”18 In another case from 1893, the Court considered
due process for a Chinese laborer who did not possess the proper documentation for
entry.19 At the time, a residence certificate was required for entry to prove the alien
had lived in the United States prior to an enactment banning Chinese immigration.20
Such a certificate could not be obtained unless an alien found a non-Chinese witness
to assert he met the qualifications.21 Holding that deportation was not a punishment
and therefore not deserving of criminal protections, the Court further explained that
the alien was not deprived of due process.22 In drawing an analogy to a contempora-
neous case, the Court explained Congress’s role and its potential interaction with the
executive branch, noting:
Congress might, if it saw fit, authorize the courts to investigate
and ascertain the facts upon which the alien’s right to land was
made by the statutes to depend, yet Congress might intrust the
final determination of those facts to an executive officer, and
that, if it did so, his order was due process of law, and no other
tribunal, unless expressly authorized by law to do so, was at lib-
erty to [re-examine] the evidence on which he acted, or to con-
trovert its sufficiency.23
Therefore, the larger questions both as to whether, and on what conditions, aliens
would be permitted to remain in the United States were political, and the Court could
not “properly express an opinion upon the wisdom, the policy or the justice of the
measures enacted by Congress.”24 Ten years later, in 1903, the Court would again
confront the due process question in Yamataya v. Fisher.25 Although the Court held
firmly to the belief that Congress could exclude anyone from the United States, pre-
scribe any terms and conditions for entry, establish regulations on deportation, and
“commit the enforcement of such provisions, conditions and regulations exclusively
to executive officers, without judicial intervention,” there was a slight shift in the
Court’s willingness to analyze procedural due process.26
18 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893).
19 Id. at 703–04 (discussing an unnamed case in which a Chinese immigrant presented
three Chinese witnesses and the Court did not accept them as “credible”).
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 709.
23 Id. at 713.
24 Id. at 731.
25 See 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
26 Id. at 97 (emphasis added).
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In that case, a Japanese came to America in violation of a statute because she
was found to be a pauper and would likely become a public charge.27 Kaoru
Yamataya alleged that the investigation was procedurally inadequate.28 Not only did
she allege that she did not have any legal assistance, did not understand the English
language, and did not grasp the gravity of the investigation itself, but also that she
did not have an opportunity to prove she was not a pauper or likely to become a
public charge.29 The Court elected to leave to one side the issue of whether an alien
who entered illegally could properly invoke due process.30 However, if a right to
claim due process existed, any alien who had properly entered this country, could
not “be taken into custody and deported without giving him [any] opportunity to be
heard upon the questions involving his right to be and remain in the United States.”31
When measuring the flex of this potential protection against executive power, the
Court maintained that it had never held, and could not be understood to be declaring,
that “administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving
the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in ‘due
process of law.’”32 Due process could not be ignored. However, the Court still found
that Yamataya received all process that was constitutionally due to her—the Court
concluded that she received both notice and an opportunity to be heard, the floor that
due process required.33 And although the Court recognized the problems with her
proceedings, informal notice and her inability to understand the language or impor-
tance of the proceedings did not “justify the intervention of the courts,” and prevent
her from receiving a meaningful opportunity to be heard.34
How does this looming bastion of congressional and executive power interact
with a constitutional protection of procedural due process, which requires the govern-
ment to provide certain procedures before taking away protected rights? Due process
is typically a two-stage inquiry: first, is the constitutional plank triggered by govern-
ment action in an individualized decisionmaking process concerning a protected
interest; and second, if due process is triggered, what process is constitutionally due?
Yamataya seems to stand as proof that even in the earliest days of consideration, when
an alien was assumed to have passed the first stage and be entitled to protection, she
27 Id. at 87.
28 Id. at 88.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 100. The Court said that answering this question was not necessary because the
statute did not “necessarily exclude opportunity to the immigrant to be heard, when such
opportunity is of right.” Id.
31 Id. at 101. In other words, due process, if granted, would require an opportunity to be
heard. An alien that had properly entered the country could not be deported without due pro-
cess, though the Court was hesitant to decide the due process fate of illegal aliens.
32 Id. at 100.
33 Id. at 102.
34 Id.
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was given a pittance of process at the second.35 In fact, over sixty years after Chae
Chan Ping,36 the Court would again summarize Congress’s overwhelming power in
the area of due process when it ominously intoned: “[w]hatever the procedure autho-
rized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”37
In other words, there was no need to measure the process provided by Congress
against a constitutional standard; aliens were fortunate to receive whatever process
Congress was willing to give and deserved nothing more.
This notion that due process for aliens is whatever Congress designates was
penned by Justice Minton, writing for the Court in the 1950 case, United States ex
rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy.38 That case has never been explicitly overruled, but the
Supreme Court has continued to struggle with the concept of procedural due process
as it concerns aliens desiring entry. Before delving into Executive Order 13769 and
the Ninth Circuit’s denial of a stay regarding a temporary restraining order concern-
ing that Executive Order, it is necessary to understand the history of Supreme Court
jurisprudence in this area. The Ninth Circuit relied on several cases familiar to scholars
that study procedural due process in the context of immigration,39 but unpacking the
Court’s argument requires a baseline understanding of the case law.
Between 1889 and 1950, the fabric of America evolved and deepened, but the ju-
dicial recognition of Congressional dominance over immigration law remained the
same.40 In 1950, the Supreme Court considered Knauff.41 Ellen Knauff was born in
Germany and ultimately married a naturalized citizen of the United States.42 In 1948,
her husband sought to have her naturalized, but she was denied entry to the United
States and detained at Ellis Island.43 The Attorney General entered a final order of
exclusion that did not allow a hearing on the grounds that her admission would be
prejudicial to the interests of the United States.44 She filed a writ of habeas corpus
for her detention based mostly on provisions of the War Brides Act.45 A section of
that statute allowed the Attorney General to deny a hearing if he “determined that the
alien was excludable under the regulations on the basis of information of a confiden-
tial nature, the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the public interest.”46
35 See Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
1, 18–22 (2006).
36 See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
37 Id. at 544.
38 Id.
39 See generally Washington v. Trump (Washington II ), 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017)
(per curiam) (order denying stay of District Court’s TRO).
40 See supra notes 12–38 and accompanying text.
41 338 U.S. at 539.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 539–40.
45 Id. at 540.
46 Id. at 541.
70 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:65
The Court began its decision with a reminder that aliens seeking admission do
not do so under any claim of right.47 To the contrary, “[a]dmission of aliens to the
United States is a privilege granted by the sovereign United States Government.
Such privilege is granted to an alien only upon such terms as the United States shall
prescribe. It must be exercised in accordance with the procedure which the United
States provides.”48 Congress can lawfully delegate this ability to make “the decision
to admit or to exclude an alien . . . [to] the President . . . [and] [t]he action of the
executive officer under such authority is final and conclusive.”49 This decision of the
political branches is not judicially reviewable unless there is an express provision
authorizing review.50 Here, Congress had prescribed a process which brokered no
hearing if the Attorney General chose, and so Ellen Knauff did not have to receive
one.51 Congress mandated the process due, and had the power to do so in whatever
capacity it wished regarding entering aliens.52
Just two years later, in 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) was
passed.53 Until the addition of this comprehensive law, Congress had passed individ-
ual legislation for each new immigration regulation.54 These requirements ranged
from literacy laws to exclusions purely on the basis of race.55 The new law consoli-
dated and codified many existing provisions and organized immigration law into one
place.56 The INA remains today the main source of immigration law, although it has
been amended many times.57 This core statutory language would provide a congres-
sional rubric for immigration.
In 1953, directly after the passage of the INA, the Supreme Court dealt with a pair
of cases involving lawful permanent residents (LPRs) and their attempted re-entry
47 Id. at 542.
48 Id. Later the Court stressed, “[t]he exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty.
The right to do so stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive
power to control the foreign affairs of the nation. When Congress prescribes a procedure
concerning the admissibility of aliens, it is not dealing alone with a legislative power. It is
implementing an inherent executive power.” Id. (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp.
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893)).




53 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (for purposes
of this Article, the INA will be cited as codified in Title 8 of the United States Code).
54 See generally U. S. SELECT COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRA-
TION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 161–216
(1981) (discussing the legislative process of enacting new legislation for every new regulation).
55 Id.
56 See id.
57 See, e.g., id. at 248 (providing an explanation of an amendment to the INA while the
Act remained in force).
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into the United States.58 An alien designated as a LPR is authorized to live and work
in the United States on a permanent basis.59 This is distinguishable from non-
immigrant visa holders who may reside or work in the United States on a more
temporary basis.60 The card indicating that an alien is a LPR is commonly referred
to as a “green card.”61
The first case in this pairing, Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, involved a Chinese
sailor who was properly admitted into the United States after marrying an American
citizen.62 He applied for, and received, lawful permanent residence in 1945.63 In
1950, he joined the Coast Guard and began serving on a merchant vessel visiting
several ports of call.64 When he returned to America via San Francisco he was
denied entry as “an alien whose entry was deemed prejudicial to the public interest.”65
Kwong sought a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that “his detention was arbitrary and
capricious and a denial of due process of law.”66 As in Knauff, the Attorney General
denied him all information as to the nature and reason for the accusations against
him and any opportunity to be heard.67 Yet the Court held that the Knauff case was
not on point because Knauff was an alien entrant and not a resident alien.68 The
Court determined it must consider first what Kwong’s right to a hearing would have
been if he was continuously within the territorial boundaries of the United States.69
It was “well established” to the Court that a LPR who remains physically inside the
United States was entitled to due process.70 This process meant that even though he
could be deported, he was “entitled to notice of the nature of the charge and a
hearing at least before an executive or administrative tribunal.”71 Congress’s power
in this area was slightly limited, because “[a]lthough Congress may prescribe con-
ditions for his expulsion and deportation, not even Congress may expel him without
allowing him a fair opportunity to be heard.”72
58 See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); Shaughnessy v. United States
ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
59 Nancy Morawetz, The Invisible Border: Restrictions on Short-Term Travel by Non-
citizens, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 201, 202 (2007).
60 Id. at 223.
61 See Daniel Pines, Overseas Lawful Permanent Resident Terrorists: The Novel Approach
for Revoking Their LPR Status, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 209, 210 (2014).
62 344 U.S. at 592.
63 Id. at 592–93.
64 Id. at 594.
65 Id. at 595.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 596.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 597.
72 Id. at 597–98.
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Therefore, Kwong would receive due process if he was “deportable” as a per-
manent resident but not if he was “excludable”73 as an arriving alien.74 The Court
went on to analyze the specific regulations at issue, holding that a denial of a hearing
was not unconstitutional if it was limited only to excludable aliens.75 But which
category properly classified Kwong? A mere voyage to foreign parts could not de-
prive Kwong of his constitutional right to procedural due process.76 The Court held
that “[w]here neither Congress, the President, the Secretary of State nor the Attorney
General has inescapably said so, we are not ready to assume that any of them has
attempted to deprive such a person of a fair hearing.”77 Kwong remained a perma-
nent resident of the United States even though he had left the country and attempted
to return, and thus he was due whatever additional process a deportation hearing
could offer over an exclusion hearing.78
A little over a month later, the Court heard another case of exclusion regarding
a permanent resident: Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei.79 Ignatz Mezei
was born to either Hungarian or Romanian parents in Gibraltar and lived in the United
States from 1923–48.80 He left America ostensibly to visit his dying mother in
Romania, but he was denied entry there.81 After troubles with traveling and obtain-
ing the proper paperwork, Mezei eventually made his way back to New York in
1950, where he was detained as temporarily excluded.82 The Attorney General made
the exclusion permanent without a hearing on the “basis of information of a confi-
dential nature, the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the public interest.”83
Mezei was found excludable for security reasons.84 However, he remained on Ellis
Island because no other country would take him in—France and Great Britain re-
fused him permission to land, and Hungary and a dozen Latin American countries
all turned him down as well.85 Ultimately, Mezei “sat on Ellis Island because this
country shut him out and others were unwilling to take him in.”86
Detained indefinitely on Ellis Island, Mezei sought relief through a series of habeas
corpus proceedings.87 In analyzing his case, the Court reaffirmed the long recognized
73 Id. at 599.
74 Id. at 593.
75 Id. at 600.
76 Id. at 601.
77 Id. at 601–02.
78 Id.
79 345 U.S. 206 (1953).





85 Id. at 209.
86 Id.
87 Id.
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principle that “the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign at-
tribute exercised by the Government’s political departments [is] largely immune from
judicial control.”88 Congress had exercised these powers and “expressly authorized
the President to impose additional restrictions on aliens entering or leaving the United
States during periods of international tension and strife.”89 The due process inquiry
concerning the exercise of this power rested on the distinction between “aliens who
have once passed through our gates, even illegally” and “an alien on the threshold
of initial entry.”90 Aliens inside the United States were entitled to “proceedings con-
forming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law,” but
aliens outside the United States received whatever process authorized by Congress.91
The question remained of how to classify Mezei. The Court held that his geo-
graphical location at Ellis Island was “not an entry into the United States.”92 Even
though Congress allowed him to be removed from ship to shore, this was “an act of
legislative grace, [and] bestow[ed] no additional rights.”93 Mezei must still be treated
as though he was stopped at the border.94 But how was his status as a permanent
resident affected by his absence from the United States? Unlike Kwong’s “tempo-
rary absence,”95 Mezei had a “protracted absence” that was deemed by statute to be
a “clear break in an alien’s continuous residence.”96 Drawing a factual distinction
between the two facially similar cases, the Court explained that “[u]nlike [Kwong]
who with full security clearance and documentation pursued his vocation for four
months aboard an American ship, [Mezei], apparently without authorization or reentry
papers, simply left the United States and remained behind the Iron Curtain for 19
months.”97 The Court thus had “no difficulty” in holding Mezei to be an entering alien,
deserving of an exclusion hearing.98 Because an exclusion hearing was the proper
choice, the executive’s decision to deny entry as a result of that hearing was final
and conclusive, and the Court could not review it without express authorization.99
Justice Jackson was joined by Justice Frankfurter in a dissenting opinion that
argued Mezei’s refuge at Ellis Island only meant freedom if he were an amphibian.100
88 Id. at 210.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 212.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 213.
93 Id. at 215.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 213 (“Only the other day we held that under some circumstances temporary
absence from our shores cannot constitutionally deprive a returning lawfully resident alien
of his right to be heard.”).
96 Id. at 214.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 212.
100 Id. at 220 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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In actuality it was a prison. Jackson noted the proper protocols that Mezei had com-
pleted, noting that after his visit
[t]o his aged and ailing mother that was prolonged by disturbed
conditions of Eastern Europe, he obtained a visa for admission is-
sued by our consul and returned to New York. There the Attorney
General refused to honor his documents and turned him back as
a menace to this Nation’s security.101
As Mezei was clearly denied liberty, triggering a due process inquiry, Jackson turned
to the issue of due process of law in both its substantive and procedural forms.102
Procedurally, he argued that due process should be more rigid and act as “a special-
ized responsibility within the competence of the judiciary on which they do not bend
before political branches of the Government, as they should on matters of policy
which comprise substantive law.”103 Even though the law properly placed more re-
strictions on aliens than on citizens, the baseline of fairness “does not vary with the
status of the accused. . . . If [procedures] would be unfair to citizens, [courts] cannot
defend the fairness of them when applied to the more helpless and handicapped
alien.”104 The dissent grappled with the harsh logic that if the alien had no right to
entry, he had no rights at all. After all, Jackson analogized, “[i]t would effectuate [an
alien’s] exclusion to eject him bodily into the sea or to set him adrift in a rowboat.
Would not such measures be condemned judicially as a deprivation of life without
the due process of law?”105 However, the main issue for Jackson was the indefinite
detention, as even he conceded that “[e]xclusion of an alien without judicial hearing,
of course, does not deny due process when it can be accomplished merely by turning
him back on land or returning him by sea.”106 However, when confinement became
the means for enforcing exclusion as opposed to simply turning Mezei away, he was
owed more process.107 Notice and an opportunity to be heard was “the more due him
when he [was] entrapped into leaving the other shore by reliance on a visa which the
Attorney General refuse[d] to honor.”108
Ten years later, in the case of Rosenberg v. Fleuti,109 the Court again considered
the issue of how to classify a LPR who had left the country and attempted return.110
George Fleuti was a Swiss national who became a permanent resident in 1952 and
101 Id. at 219.
102 Id. at 222.
103 Id. at 224.
104 Id. at 225.
105 Id. at 226–27.
106 Id. at 227.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
110 Id.
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was present continuously in the United States except for a visit to Mexico in 1956
that lasted a few hours.111 In 1959, the government attempted to deport Fleuti for
committing a crime involving moral turpitude, but the crime did not rise to the level
required by statute.112 The government again attempted to deport Fleuti on the
grounds that he had been excludable at the time his 1956 re-entry to the United
States under INA 212(a)(4).113 The language of the statute excluded aliens who suf-
fered from a “psychopathic personality,” which was interpreted to apply to Fleuti
as a homosexual.114 This statutory plank for removal had not been in effect in 1952
when Fleuti had first achieved permanent residence, but was in place when he re-
turned from Mexico in 1956.115 Fleuti challenged the constitutionality of the provi-
sion, but the Supreme Court, invoking the canon of constitutional avoidance, chose
not to answer the vagueness issue.116 The Court instead focused on whether Fleuti’s
return from Mexico in 1956 could properly be classified as an “entry” under the
statute.117 At the time, section 101(a)(13) defined entry:
The term “entry” means any coming of an alien into the United
States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying posses-
sion, whether voluntarily or otherwise, except that an alien having
a lawful permanent residence in the United States shall not be
regarded as making an entry into the United States for the pur-
poses of the immigration laws if the alien proves to the satisfac-
tion of the Attorney General that his departure to a foreign port
or place or to an outlying possession was not intended or reason-
ably to be expected by him or his presence in a foreign port or
place or in an outlying possession was not voluntary . . . .118
The real statutory interpretation question for the Court was thus whether Fleuti fit
into the exception allowed for lawful permanent residents—that is, was his “short visit
to Mexico . . . a ‘departure to a foreign port or place . . . [that] was not intended’”?119
After a discussion of developing case law and legislative history,120 where the Court
weighed “high and momentous” interests at stake for the alien,121 the Court concluded
111 Id. at 450.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 450–51.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 453.
116 See id. at 451.
117 Id. at 451–52.
118 Id. at 452 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1952)).
119 Id. (alteration in original) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1952)).
120 Id. at 453–60.
121 Id. at 456 (quoting Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947)).
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that that statute should not be “woodenly construed.”122 Therefore the Court read the
intent exception in the language “as meaning an intent to depart in a manner which
can be regarded as meaningfully interruptive of the alien’s permanent residence.”123
Factors to consider when categorizing a trip included, but were not limited to, the
length of time the alien was absent, the purpose of the visit, and whether the alien had
to procure any travel documents to make the trip.124 For example, “if the purpose of
leaving the country is to accomplish some object which is itself contrary to some
policy reflected in our immigration laws, it would appear that the interruption of
residence thereby occurring would properly be regarded as meaningful.”125 Fleuti’s
Mexico trip was thus likely to be classified as “an innocent, casual, and brief
excursion by a resident alien outside this country’s borders . . . [not] ‘intended’ as a
departure disruptive of his resident alien status and therefore may not subject him to
the consequences of an ‘entry’ into the country on his return.”126 Thus, it seemed that
triggering a due process analysis depended not only on whether an alien was
arriving, but whether he or she was arriving for the first time or had already created
ties with the United States.127
Although not solely concerned with procedural due process, the Court applied
the INA to determine an exclusion case almost ten years later that granted and re-
affirmed the government’s broad power over immigration: Kleindienst v. Mandel.128
Ernest Mandel was a Belgian citizen who was a self-described revolutionary Marxist
who advocated the “economic, governmental, and international doctrines of world
communism.”129 He visited the United States temporarily in 1962 and 1968 to speak
at universities.130 When he applied for entry to the United States in 1969, his request
was denied because he identified as a Communist, and he received no waiver.131 Of
course it was clear that Mandel himself, “as an unadmitted and nonresident alien, had
122 Id. at 460.
123 Id. at 462.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. As the record did not contain a detailed description or characterization of the trip
to Mexico beyond the fact that Fleuti was gone for “about a couple of hours,” the Court
chose to remand the case for consideration consistent with its interpretation of the statutory
language. Id. at 463.
127 Id. at 462.
128 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
129 Id. at 756.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 756–57. Previously he had received a waiver to speak. There was some issue
concerning whether Mandel had been informed of previous restrictions to conform to his
stated itinerary and purpose, and even though the Department of State did recommend to the
Attorney General that Mandel receive a waiver for this trip, that waiver was denied. Id. at
759. The INA rendered aliens inadmissible who “write or publish . . . the economic, inter-
national, and governmental doctrines of world communism or the establishment in the United
States of a totalitarian dictatorship.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(G) (1952).
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no constitutional right of entry to this country as a nonimmigrant or otherwise.”132
However, those wishing to hear him speak claimed that not hearing from and meeting
with Mandel in person was a denial of their First Amendment rights and procedural
due process.133
Although the Court conceded that First Amendment rights were implicated, that
alone did not control the issue.134 After all, the Government had “the power to exclude
aliens . . . ‘inherent in [its] sovereignty, necessary for maintaining normal international
relations and defending the country against foreign encroachments and dangers—a
power to be exercised exclusively by the political branches of government.’”135 The
Court’s reaffirmations on that point had been “legion” and in fact, “‘[o]ver no con-
ceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over’
the admission of aliens.”136 However, there was a demarcation between congressional
power and executive power. The Court, quoting Justice Frankfurter from a previous
case, stated:
As to the extent of the power of Congress under review, there is
not merely ‘a page of history’ . . . but a whole volume. . . . In
the enforcement of these policies, the Executive Branch of the
Government must respect the procedural safeguards of due pro-
cess. . . . But that the formulation of these policies is entrusted
exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly embedded
in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any
aspect of our government.137
Therefore, even though Congress might retain almost unlimited power in the area
of crafting policies with regard to entry or exclusion, the executive branch must still
apply due process in the policies’ implementation.138 However, when, as here, Con-
gress delegated its power to the executive, and the executive exercised that power “on
the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither look
behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against
the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal communication with the
applicant.”139 The plenary power of Congress still casts a long, protective shadow.
132 Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 762.
133 Id. at 760. There were also claims of equal protection violation, unconstitutional dele-
gation of legislative power to the Attorney General, and arbitrary and capricious application
of the statute. Id.
134 Id. at 765.
135 Id. (citation omitted).
136 Id. at 765–66 (emphasis added) (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan,
214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)).
137 Id. at 766–67 (quoting Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (citation omitted)).
138 See id.
139 Id. at 770. The Court also noted that “[w]hat First Amendment or other grounds may
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Though not an immigration case, Mathews v. Eldridge140 intervened into this
timeline, changed the way courts analyzed procedural due process, and provided a
framework for consideration as to whether the standard was met.141 The Court took
the opportunity to consolidate its procedural due process analysis, concluding that
while “[t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard
‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,’” what process is due in any given
circumstance “generally requires consideration of three distinct factors.”142 These
three factors included: first, the private interest that will be affected by the action;
second, the governmental interest, including any monetary or administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would require; and third, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of an individual’s interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.143
The way the factors are structured, particularly the third factor concerning the value
of a piece of process, requires the aggrieved party to identify a piece of process that
was missing in the underlying proceeding and argue for the merits of its inclusion.144
This formula for considering appropriate process to be due was applied to the
immigration context by the Supreme Court in 1982 in Landon v. Plasencia.145 Maria
Plasencia was a LPR from El Salvador who made a brief visit abroad and attempted
to return to the United States.146 She was returning from Mexico and was stopped
at the border by an Immigration and Naturalization Service officer who found six
nonresident aliens in her car.147 Plasencia received a notice dated June 30, 1975, that
told her an exclusion hearing would be held at 11:00 AM on June 30, 1975.148 This
afforded her with only a few hours of notice of the hearing and the charges.149 She
was charged with exclusion under 212(a)(31) of the INA, which excludes “any alien
seeking admission ‘who at any time shall have, knowingly and for gain, encouraged,
induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the
be available for attacking exercise of discretion for which no justification whatsoever is
advanced is a question we neither address nor decide in this case.” Id.
140 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
141 Id. At particular issue in that case was whether respondent was entitled to receive an
evidentiary hearing before the termination of his social security benefits. Id. at 323; see also
Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1312 (2012).
142 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333, 335 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
143 Id. at 335. While the Court lists them in a different order, separating the individual and
governmental interest by putting erroneous deprivation in the middle, the weighing is the
same and the comparison can be cleaner by analyzing the interests together in turn. See
generally id. at 335–49 (discussing and applying the factors).
144 Id. at 335, 343.
145 459 U.S. 21, 23 (1982).
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 23–24.
149 Id. at 35.
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United States in violation of law.’”150 An immigration judge found her excludable,
and held that her trip to Mexico was a “meaningful departure” from the United States,
rendering her return to this country an entry.151 She eventually filed a writ of habeas
corpus in a United States District Court, which found that she was entitled to a de-
portation hearing instead of an exclusion hearing because her departure was not
meaningful.152 The government urged the Supreme Court to apply the Fleuti doc-
trine and find that Plasencia’s attempted crossing of the border to smuggle people
across for profit rendered her departure meaningful, and thus she was an alien
desiring entry as if for the first time.153 But a threshold question for the Court was
whether the issue of entry and the application of the Fleuti exception could be
litigated properly in an exclusion hearing.154 Did the choice of hearing, exclusion or
deportation, make a difference?
The Supreme Court acknowledged that exclusion hearings and deportation
hearings differed in several ways.155 Not only was there an ostensible geographical
distinction, but there was also a notice issue. Cases for deportation required by reg-
ulation at least seven days’ notice, but exclusion hearings only required that “the ap-
plicant is informed of the issues confronting him at some point in the hearing, and he
is given a reasonable opportunity to meet them.”156 The Court found that “[t]he stat-
utory scheme [was] clear: Congress intended that the determinations of both ‘entry’
and the existence of grounds for exclusion could be made at an exclusion hear-
ing.”157 In other words, there was no prohibition in the statutory language or history
for Plasencia to have an exclusion hearing merely because she was a LPR.
This conclusion did not resolve the procedural due process inquiry.158 While the
Court made no finding on “the contours of the process that [was] due or whether the
process accorded Plasencia was insufficient,” it did hold that she could invoke the due
process clause itself.159 Therefore, even if Plasencia was outside the scope of the
Fleuti doctrine (an issue to be decided at her hearing), she was still able to argue that
the Due Process Clause applied to her. Potentially this due process invocation was
only for LPRs whether they were being excluded or deported.160
150 Id. at 23 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(31) (1952)).
151 Id. at 24.
152 Id. at 25.
153 Id. at 29–30.
154 Id. at 32.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 26 (citing In re Salazar, 17 I. & N. Dec. 167, 169 (B.I.A. 1979)). Other dif-
ferences included appellate procedures and substantive rights, such as being able to depart
voluntarily or seeking other relief and choosing the destination of deportation. Id.
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The Court began its analysis by reaffirming the concept that “an alien seeking
initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional
rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sov-
ereign prerogative.”161 However, the transition from entering alien to LPR makes a
difference. The Court noted that an alien’s status changes after he or she gains ad-
mission into the United States “and begins to develop the ties that go with perma-
nent residence.”162 The Court did not decide the full scope of Mezei or resolve its
dissonance with Kwong Hai Chew, because the United States conceded that Plasencia
had a right to due process.163
To evaluate what process Plasencia was due, the Court invoked Mathews v.
Eldridge to weigh “the interest at stake for the individual, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of the interest through the procedures used as well as the probable value
of additional or different procedural safeguards, and the interest of the government
in using the current procedures rather than additional or different procedures.”164
Plasencia’s interest was “weighty” as she stood to lose “the right ‘to stay and live
and work in this land of freedom’” and the “right to rejoin her immediate family.”165
However, the government’s interest was also “weighty” and the Court recognized that
“it must weigh heavily in the balance that control over matters of immigration is a sov-
ereign prerogative, largely within the control of the Executive and the Legislature.”166
The role of the judiciary, the Court decided, was limited to a judgment about whether
due process was met and could not extend to “imposing procedures that merely dis-
place congressional choices of policy.”167
Plasencia made three procedural arguments, thus allowing the Court the oppor-
tunity to utilize Mathews as designed and consider each procedural request in turn:
(1) that the immigration judge had improperly placed the burden of proof on her
instead of the state; (2) that her notice was inadequate; and (3) that she was allowed
to waive her representation without an understanding of that right or the consequences
of waiving it.168 Although the Court did not rule on the sufficiency of the hearing,169
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 34. Mezei, Kwong Hai Chew, and Fleuti were concerned with what type of en-
trance a LPR made into the United States, and Plasencia was determined with the process given
to determine what type of entrance she made. See supra text accompanying notes 62–127.
164 Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976)).
165 Id. (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945)).
166 Id.
167 Id. at 35. This was especially important to the Court as it had previously found that Con-
gress did not intend for deportation procedures to be used in situations like Plasencia’s. Id.
168 Id. at 35–36.
169 Id. at 37. The Court determined that it could not properly assess whether the hearing
was constitutionally adequate because it did not have enough information on “the risk of erro-
neous deprivation, the efficacy of additional procedural safeguards, and the Government’s
interest in providing no further procedures.” Id.
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it did note that “[i]f the exclusion hearing is to ensure fairness, it must provide
Plasencia an opportunity to present her case effectively, though at the same time it
cannot impose an undue burden on the Government.”170 Therefore, it would seem
after this case that a LPR, even one in an exclusion hearing, is entitled to the ap-
plication of the due process calculus. However, if the majority of the Court could
not even decide in this case that same-day notice of both the hearing and her charges
was inappropriate, it seems impossible to discern what would qualify as too little
notice. The notice requirements that existed were extremely lax under an exclusion
standard, and there does not seem to be any question that the notice she received
would suffice for an exclusion hearing even though she was a LPR.171 Therefore, she
won the application of due process to her case, but it did not necessarily merit her
any additional process.172
Justice Marshall concurred in part and dissented in part.173 While he agreed with
the majority that Plasencia could be relegated to an exclusion hearing, he argued that
the process offered to her was plainly insufficient for due process.174 He argued that
the notice she received was inadequate “to afford her a reasonable opportunity to
demonstrate that she was not excludable.”175 The decision to exclude her was given
to Plasencia less than twenty-four hours after she was detained at the border, and the
next day she was informed in English of her hearing that would take place at 11:00 AM
the same day.176 Only when the hearing started was she “given notice in her native
language of the charges against her and of her right to retain counsel and to present
evidence.”177 Marshall argued that, “[w]hen a permanent resident alien’s substantial
interest in remaining in this country is at stake, the Due Process Clause forbids the
Government to stack the deck in this fashion.”178
In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act (IIRIRA).179 Before this Act that amended the INA, there was a
distinction between those who had physically entered into the country and those
who had not.180 Aliens who had physically entered the country, whether legally or
170 Id. at 36.
171 See id. at 37.
172 See id.
173 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
174 Id. at 38.
175 Id. at 39. Marshall noted that because he found the notice to be constitutionally in-
sufficient, it was unnecessary to consider her other procedural concerns. Id. at 38 n.2.
176 Id. at 39.
177 Id. Even at the hearing, Marshall contended that the charges were inadequately ex-
plained and thus, “deprived Plasencia of a fair opportunity to show that she was not excludable
under the standards set forth in the Immigration and Nationality Act.” Id. at 40.
178 Id. at 41.
179 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 309, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in Title 8, Chapter 12 of the United States Code).
180 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1952).
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illegally, were subject to deportation hearings.181 Aliens who had not yet entered
were subject to exclusion hearings.182 This distinction had the effect of giving more
process rights to those who had snuck across the border than those who were at-
tempting to enter legally.183 The 1996 IIRIRA changed this distinction, bringing the
focus to whether an alien had been admitted or was seeking admission.184 Admission
was defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection
and authorization by an immigration officer.”185 The statute further clarified that
“[a]n alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States shall not
be regarded as seeking an admission into the United States for purposes of the im-
migration laws unless” certain other conditions were met.186 This change absolved
courts from considering whether departures were meaningful in the abstract and
provided a rubric that was concerned less with territorial gridlines and more with
proper process.187 The amendments also collapsed the two different types of hear-
ings, exclusion and deportation, into one: removal.188
Concerning removal, the INA provided that “[a]n alien present in the United
States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States . . . shall be
deemed for purposes of this [Act] an applicant for admission.”189 If the immigration
officer determines that an alien who is arriving is inadmissible because he or she has
misrepresented information to obtain an entrance document or is not in possession
of a valid entrance document, the alien may be removed “without further hearing
or review unless the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a
fear of persecution.”190 This is what is known as expedited removal. Conversely, if
the officer instead determines that an alien seeking admission is “not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,” the alien is detained for a regular removal
181 See In re Pena, 26 I. & N. Dec. 613, 617 n.5 (B.I.A. 2015) (explaining the “bifurcated”
proceeding system in immigration before the passage of the IIRIRA).
182 See id.
183 See id.
184 See IIRIRA § 301(a). IIRIRA deleted the definition of entry in INA 101(a)(13) and
substituted a definition of admission. See 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(A) (2012).
185 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A).
186 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C). These conditions include: “abandon[ing] or relinquish[ing] . . .
status,” “be[ing] absent from the United States for a continuous period in excess of 180
days,” “engag[ing] in illegal activity after having departed the United States,” “depart[ing]
from the United States while under legal process seeking removal,” “committ[ing] an offense
identified in section 1182(a)(2)” unless relief was granted, “attempting to enter at a time or
place other than as designated by immigration officers,” or simply “not be[ing] admitted to
the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(13)(C)(i)–(vi).
187 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(i)–(vi).
188 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2012).
189 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) (2012).
190 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C) (2012) and 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(7) (2012) for grounds of inadmissibility).
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hearing.191 The only judicial review for expedited removal concerns whether the alien
has a non-arriving status such as a United States citizen, LPR, or previously admitted
asylee or refugee.192
In 2001, the Court grappled with the new distinction over admission as opposed
to entry in the context of detention in Zadvydas v. Davis.193 Previously, the designa-
tion of being a LPR or merely an entering alien had made an analytical distinction
for due process analysis. However, the Court seemed to reverse course on the issue
of delineating between admitted and non-admitted aliens for the purposes of process,
noting, “once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the
Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens,
whether their presence is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”194 Combined
with the Court’s holding in Plasencia, this statement might mean that while due pro-
cess applies to both admitted and non-admitted aliens, the scope of that process will
surely differ.195 However, the Court still had to reconcile this concept with its holding
in Mezei, which it did not overrule.196
Kestutis Zadvydas was detained after his final order of removal was entered in
order to effectuate his departure.197 Zadvydas was born to Lithuanian parents in a
displaced persons camp in Germany and moved to America when he was eight years
old.198 He had a history of flight and a long criminal record, and was finally ordered
deported to Germany in 1994.199 Much like Mezei before him, Zadvydas had trouble
being deported because no country would take him in.200 Germany would not accept
him because he was not a German citizen, and Lithuania would not accept him because
he was not a Lithuanian citizen or permanent resident.201 The United States appealed
to the Dominican Republic as well, because Zadvydas’s wife was from there, but to
no avail.202 The INA allows for an alien to be in custody during a ninety day removal
period following a final removal order.203 It also provides that certain aliens “may
be detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to [certain]
191 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Removal hearings are generally governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.
192 ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 12, at 814; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii).
193 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
194 Id. at 693 (emphasis added) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982); Mathews
v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596–98 n.5
(1953); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); cf. Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)).
195 See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 37 (1982).
196 See generally id.






203 Id. at 682 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (Supp. V 1994)).
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terms of supervision.”204 When he could not be sent home, the ninety-day period
expired and Zadvydas was still in custody.205 He filed a writ of habeas corpus pro-
testing his indefinite detention as unconstitutional.206 The Court used a “‘cardinal
principle’ of statutory interpretation” to interpret the statute as not posing a constitu-
tional concern.207 Because it was true that “[a] statute permitting indefinite detention
of an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem,”208 and the Court “found
nothing in the history of these statutes that clearly demonstrates a congressional
intent to authorize indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention,”209 the Court was forced
to hold that detention would be presumptively reasonable for six months, after
which the Government must make a showing to continue the detention.210
In a comparison to the Mezei case, the Court noted that Mezei was “‘treated,’
for constitutional purposes, ‘as if stopped at the border.’ And that made all the
difference.”211 The Court acknowledged that “[t]he distinction between an alien who
has effected an entry into the United States and one who has never entered runs
throughout immigration law.”212 Even though Mezei had reached Ellis Island, the
Court characterized its previous “rejection of Mezei’s challenge to the procedures
by which he was deemed excludable and its rejection of his challenge to continued
detention rested upon a basic territorial distinction.”213 Because his presence on the
island was not considered a landing, it did not impact his constitutional status.214 The
Court found this to be a “critical distinction between Mezei and the present case[ ]”
and that it did not need to further consider the comparison.215 However, it seems im-
possible to reconcile the discussion about the Mezei case where territorial distinction
(or today, the admission distinction) matters and the Court’s broad initial statement
that due process applies for any alien within the United States.216 In fact, Justice Scalia
204 Id. at 689 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (Supp. V 1994)). The categories of aliens
subject to this potential additional detention are:
inadmissible aliens, criminal aliens, aliens who have violated their non-
immigrant status conditions, and aliens removable for certain national
security or foreign relations reasons, as well as any alien “who has
been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community
or unlikely to comply with the order of removal.”
Id. at 688 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (Supp. V 1994)).
205 Id. at 684.
206 Id. at 684–85.
207 Id. at 689 (quoting Cromwell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
208 Id. at 690.
209 Id. at 699.
210 Id. at 701.
211 Id. at 693 (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953)).
212 Id.
213 Id. at 694.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 See id. at 690.
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stated in his dissent that “Mezei thus stands unexplained and undistinguished by the
Court’s opinion.”217 The only possible explanation may be that although due process
applies in both contexts, the swing of the barometer is so low for those merely denied
entry and slightly higher for those properly admitted, but in all cases indefinite de-
tention would be beyond the pale.
The Court also delved into the power structure behind immigration law, and
although the Court conceded the broad power of the political branches, “that power
is subject to important constitutional limitations.”218 Crucially, the detention at issue
in Zadvydas did not require the Court to “consider the political branches’ authority to
control entry into the United States.”219 Therefore the Court did not consider “terror-
ism or other special circumstances where special arguments might be made . . . for
heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to
matters of national security.”220 The Court did recognize several significant govern-
mental factors: the expertise of the agency, executive branch primacy in foreign
policy matters, the complexity of the statute, and “the Nation’s need to ‘speak with
one voice’ in immigration matters.”221 However, the Court believed that it could
“take appropriate account of such matters without abdicating [its] legal responsibil-
ity to review the lawfulness of an alien’s continued detention.”222
In his dissent, Scalia noted that in the dissent from Mezei, Justice Jackson stated,
with no contradiction from the Court, that “[d]ue process does not invest any alien
with a right to enter the United States, nor confer on those admitted the right to remain
against the national will. Nothing in the Constitution requires admission or suffer-
ance of aliens hostile to our scheme of government.”223 This meant to Scalia that “an
alien under final order of removal stands on equal footing with an inadmissible alien
at the threshold of entry: He has no such right.”224 If the Mezei decision was not over-
turned, and it was not, Scalia felt that it controlled and gave no due process rights
to Zadvydas or any other alien who had been validly ordered removed.225
Zadvydas was decided on June 28, 2001,226 and just a few months later America
would endure the events of September 11, 2001. This tragedy would again change
the face of immigration law and bring national security to the forefront. Congress
passed the USA PATRIOT Act227 and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry
217 Id. at 704 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
218 Id. at 695 (majority opinion).
219 Id.
220 Id. at 696.
221 Id. at 700 (citation omitted).
222 Id.
223 Id. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206, 222–23 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
224 Id.
225 Id. at 705.
226 See generally id. (majority opinion).
227 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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Reform Act228 in 2001 and 2002, respectively. These changes revised the definition
of terrorist, tightened visa requirements and attempted to enhance intelligence
sharing.229 In 2002, Congress also passed the Homeland Security Act which abol-
ished the INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service) and split its functions among
three different bureaus.230 The REAL ID Act in 2005 modified judicial review of im-
migration decisions, established new requirements for documents, and again broad-
ened the definition of terrorist activities.231
Most recently, in 2015, the Supreme Court decided Kerry v. Din,232 which held
for the Government that the process afforded the petitioner was sufficient.233 How-
ever, the Court was sharply divided on the issue of whether due process was even
triggered in that case.234 The suit involved a citizen suing on her husband’s behalf
after he was denied a visa for entry.235 In announcing the judgment of the Court and
delivering an opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas joined,
Justice Scalia addressed the unusual procedure of the case, remarking that “[n]aturally,
one would expect him . . . to bring this suit. But because Berashk is an unadmitted
and nonresident alien, he has no right of entry into the United States, and no cause
of action to press in furtherance of his claim for admission.”236 Scalia asserted that
there was no constitutional right, as Din alleged, to live in the United States with her
spouse.237 This freedom was “nothing more than a deprivation of her spouse’s free-
dom to immigrate into America.”238 Scalia, Roberts, and Thomas contended that the
due process inquiry as to whether process is sufficient is simply not relevant if there
is no deprivation of a protected interest.239
Scalia traced the Due Process Clause back to the Magna Carta, advocating for
a narrow but enduring view of the rights protected therein.240 Din and even Berashk
were not denied liberty in the traditional sense and so could not have been denied
due process.241 Before the Court expanded the notion of liberty in an area where
“guideposts for responsible decisionmaking . . . are scarce and open-ended,”242 it had
228 Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173,
116 Stat. 543.
229 ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 12, at 180.
230 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
231 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302.
232 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015).
233 Id. at 2138.
234 See id. at 2139 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 2142 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
235 Id. at 2131 (majority opinion).
236 Id. (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972)).
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 2132.
240 Id. at 2132–33.
241 Id. at 2133.
242 Id. at 2134 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
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traditionally required “‘a careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty
interest,’ as well as a demonstration that the interest is ‘objectively, deeply rooted
in this Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,
such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it was] sacrificed.’”243 In the case
of immigration, Scalia thought that history showed the intent of Congress to block
this so-called liberty interest, because “[a]lthough immigration was effectively un-
regulated prior to 1875, as soon as Congress began legislating in this area it enacted
a complicated web of regulations that erected serious impediments to a person’s
ability to bring a spouse into the United States.”244 Even if Scalia were to concede
that Din was denied something “important” by the inadmissibility of her husband,
“if that is the criterion for . . . procedural due process, we are in for quite a ride.”245
Justice Kennedy and Justice Alito concurred in the judgment, but they refused
to decide whether or not Din had a protected liberty interest.246 Instead, Kennedy
wrote that, “even assuming she does, the notice she received regarding her hus-
band’s visa denial satisfied due process.”247 Kennedy referred back to Kleindienst v.
Mandel, a case “based upon due consideration of the congressional power to make
rules for the exclusion of aliens, and the ensuing power to delegate authority to the
Attorney General to exercise substantial discretion in that field.”248 The reasoning
of Mandel had “particular force in the area of national security, for which Congress
has provided specific statutory directions pertaining to visa applications by non-
citizens who seek entry to this country.”249 In Din’s case there was a “bona fide
factual basis for denying a visa to Berashk” and the Court determined that it should
not “look behind” the government’s decision.250
Justice Breyer dissented, and was joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor,
and Justice Kagan.251 The dissent stated that, “[Din] possesses the kind of ‘liberty’
interest to which the Due Process Clause grants procedural protection. And the Gov-
ernment has failed to provide her with the procedure that is constitutionally ‘due.’”252
Breyer asserted that the case law was clear that procedural rights exist as long as,
(1) she seeks protection for a liberty interest sufficiently impor-
tant for procedural protection to flow “implicit[ly]” from the
243 Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
244 Id. at 2135.
245 Id. at 2138.
246 Id. at 2139 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
247 Id.
248 Id. at 2140.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 2141 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
252 Id. at 2142 (citation omitted).
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design, object, and nature of the Due Process Clause, or (2) non-
constitutional law (a statute, for example) creates “an expectation”
that a person will not be deprived of that kind of liberty without
fair procedures.253
When applied to Din’s case, the dissent reasoned that Din easily met this burden
because the Court had long recognized marriage, including the right to live together
and raise a family, as part of the orderly pursuit of happiness envisioned by cases
like Meyer v. Nebraska.254 Breyer insisted that he was breaking “no new ground” in
the concept of due process with regard to the existence of a protected interest.255
Reasoning that Din had a protected interest at stake, Breyer investigated the
procedural protections, which “normally include notice of an adverse action, an
opportunity to present relevant proofs and arguments, before a neutral decision-
maker, and reasoned decisionmaking.”256 As Din asked only for a statement of
reasons behind the denied visa, that was the only procedural request to consider.257
Running this request through the Mathews calculus, Breyer concluded that Din’s
interests were important, the risk of an erroneous deprivation was high, and there
was little administrative cost for the Government to simply provide reasoning.258
Breyer also took issue with Kennedy’s concurrence that said the “ordinary rules
of due process must give way here to national security concerns.”259 Though Breyer
did not “deny the importance of national security,” he noted that “protecting ordinary
citizens from arbitrary government action is fundamental. Thus, the presence of secu-
rity considerations does not suspend the Constitution. Rather, it requires us to take secu-
rity needs into account when determining, for example, what ‘process’ is ‘due.’”260
II. EXECUTIVE ORDER 13769 AND JUDICIAL RESPONSE
On January 27, 2017, the President released an Executive Order with the subtitle
“Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.”261 The
thrust of this Order was to suspend visas and other immigration benefits to nationals
253 Id. (citing Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005)).
254 Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)). Additionally, the dissent found
that, as a citizen, Din had a right to live within the United States and that right should also
receive due process protection. Id.
255 Id. at 2143.
256 Id. at 2144.
257 Id.
258 Id. at 2145.
259 Id. at 2146.
260 Id. at 2147 (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 527–37 (2004) (plurality opinion)).
261 Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
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of certain countries.262 The Order required a multi-agency review to take place to
determine what information was necessary from a country to make an appropriate ad-
judication about whether an individual alien from that country was a security risk.263
In addition to a mandate to issue particular reports and review the visa process more
broadly, President Trump temporarily suspended entry into the United States for
immigrants and nonimmigrants from countries referred to in Section 217(a)(12) of
the INA.264
Section 217 of the INA authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
Secretary of State to establish a program for visa waiver.265 This is a program that
allows citizens of certain countries to travel to the United States for various reasons
for up to ninety days without having to obtain a visa.266 Specifically, the statute
allows waiver of Section 212(a)(7)(B)(i)(II) of the INA, which renders a non-
immigrant inadmissible when not in possession of a valid visa at the time of appli-
cation for admission.267 The statutory rubric for who may qualify for this program
was changed in 2015 by the Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist
Travel Prevention Act.268 This amendment to the INA added what is now subsection
12 under Section 217(c), discussing countries or areas of concern.269 According to
217(a)(12), the alien may not participate in the visa waiver program if he or she is
a national of certain countries.270 In fact, the alien may not participate in the visa
waiver program if he or she has even been present in Iraq, Syria, or any other
country designated as a country where the government has repeatedly provided
support of acts of international terrorism on or after March 1, 2011.271 The Secretary
of Homeland Security may waive the application of this bar if the Secretary deter-
mines that a waiver is in the national security interests of the United States.272
Although the statute does provide criteria for the Secretary in making a determina-
tion of whether a country’s government has provided support to acts of international
262 Id. § 3.
263 Id.
264 Id. § 3(c). This order excluded “those foreign nationals traveling on diplomatic visas,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization visas, C-2 visas for travel to the United Nations, and G-1,
G-2, G-3, and G-4 visas.” Id.
265 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(1) (2012).
266 Id.
267 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(B)(i)(II) (2012).
268 See generally Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act
of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2989 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)); see also
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, U.S. Begins Implementation of Changes
to the Visa Waiver Program (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/01/21/united
-states-begins-implementation-changes-visa-waiver-program [https://perma.cc/N746-Y53S]
[hereinafter Implementation of Changes].
269 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12).
270 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)(A)(ii). This is just one requirement of many under this section
of the INA.
271 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)(A)(i).
272 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)(C).
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terrorism,273 countries may also be designated under “any other provision of law.”274
In the Executive Order, the President “proclaim[ed] that the immigrant and non-
immigrant entry into the United States . . . from [these] countries . . . would be det-
rimental to the interests of the United States.”275 Whether this qualifies as a provi-
sion of law that gives the appropriate designation to these countries is irrelevant, as
seven countries were already designated by the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) as countries of concern when the Executive Order was signed.276
While only Iraq and Syria are mentioned directly in the statute, DHS duly en-
larged the list of affected countries. In a press release from January 21, 2016, DHS
announced that in implementing changes under the Visa Waiver Program Improve-
ment and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015, nationals of visa waiver program
countries who were also nationals or who had traveled to or were present in Iran,
Iraq, Sudan, or Syria on or after March 1, 2011, had to go through “the regular im-
migration process.”277 The release indicated that waiver was possible and that cate-
gories of travelers who might be eligible for a waiver included those who traveled
on behalf of certain organizations, for humanitarian reasons, for journalism, or for
legitimate business-related purposes.278 This change did not ban travel to the United
States or admission into the United States, it just meant that these travelers were no
longer eligible to use the visa waiver program and were “required to appear for an
interview and obtain a visa in their passports at a U.S. embassy or consulate before
traveling to the United States.”279 Less than a month later, on February 18, 2016,
DHS released another press release designating Libya, Somalia, and Yemen as three
more countries of concern.280
After limiting the visa waiver program specifically for countries already desig-
nated as those of concern, the Executive Order went on to require a list of countries
that are unwilling to provide required information on incoming aliens so that the
273 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)(D). These criteria include considerations of:
whether the presence of an alien in the country or area increases the
likelihood that the alien is a credible threat to the national security of
the United States; whether a foreign terrorist organization has a sig-
nificant presence in the country or area; and whether the country or
area is a safe haven for terrorists.
8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)(D)(ii)(I)–(III). Any determinations made under this language must
be reviewed annually. 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)(D)(iii).
274 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12)(A)(i)(II), (ii)(II).
275 Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 § 3(c) (Jan. 27, 2017).
276 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, DHS Announces Further Travel Re-
strictions for the Visa Waiver Program (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/02
/18/dhs-announces-further-travel-restrictions-visa-waiver-program [https://perma.cc/FQD2
-BDYA] [hereinafter DHS Announces Restrictions].
277 Implementation of Changes, supra note 268.
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 DHS Announces Restrictions, supra note 276.
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President may prohibit their entry and add any additional countries recommended
for similar treatment.281 The possibility for a waiver on a case-by-case basis still
existed if such a waiver was “in the national interest.”282
The overall suspension was justified by the language of the Order so that the
interim time period could be used “[t]o temporarily reduce investigative burdens on
relevant agencies . . . to ensure the proper review and maximum utilization of avail-
able resources for the screening of foreign nationals, and to ensure that adequate
standards are established to prevent infiltration by foreign terrorists or criminals,
pursuant to 212(f) of the INA.”283 Section 212(f) of the INA, most widely known for
its detailing classes of admissibility, provides:
Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of
any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental
to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation,
and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the
entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or non-
immigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he
may deem to be appropriate.284
The Executive Order also suspends the United States Refugee Admissions
Program for 120 days.285 This suspension also allows for review of the “application
and adjudication process to determine what additional procedures should be taken
to ensure that those approved for refugee admission do not pose a threat to the
security and welfare of the United States, and shall implement such additional
procedures.”286 After 120 days, the program may only be resumed for nationals for
whom these additional procedures were adequate.287 As part of this suspension, the
President again utilized Section 212(f) of the INA to “proclaim that the entry of
nationals of Syria as refugees is detrimental to the interests of the United States.”288
Entry of Syrian nationals was suspended indefinitely.289
281 Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 § 3(e)–(f) (Jan. 27, 2017).
282 Id. § 3(g).
283 Id. § 3(c).
284 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2012). The Ninth Circuit would later hold that when issuing
Executive Order 13780 under this same provision, President Trump invalidly invoked his
authority. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 770 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080
(June 26, 2017).
285 Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 § 5.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Id. § 5(c). A case-by-case waiver was still applicable under section 5(e). Id. § 5(e).
289 Id. § 5(c).
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Two states, Washington and Minnesota, challenged the Executive Order as un-
constitutional and in violation of federal law, and a federal district court granted a
TRO preventing enforcement of it.290 The government appealed to the Ninth Circuit,
moving for an emergency stay of the TRO while also appealing the order directly.291
After the court determined both that it had jurisdiction over the case and that
there were no outcome determinative standing issues,292 the court refuted the claim
that the President’s actions were simply unreviewable in this area of law.293 Finally,
the Ninth Circuit began a review of the government’s request for a stay overturning
the TRO.294 The court said that it was guided by four questions when considering
whether to issue a stay of the district court’s order: likelihood of success on the
merits, irreparable injury absent a stay, whether a stay would substantially injure the
other parties, and the public interest.295
As to the due process issue, the court cited to the Fifth Amendment and ex-
plained that the government may not deprive a person of a protected interest without
“notice and an opportunity to respond.”296 The court interpreted notice and an op-
portunity to respond broadly, saying it meant “the opportunity to present reasons not
to proceed with the deprivation and have them considered.”297 The court cited back
to the Supreme Court case of Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill298 for the
assertion that due process requires, at base, notice and an opportunity to respond.299
This citation is potentially confusing given the broad nature of the court’s inter-
pretation, as an opportunity to respond may not include all the reasons one wishes
the government not to proceed with the deprivation. In a case earlier than Loudermill,
Codd v. Velger,300 the Supreme Court reasoned that “if the hearing mandated by the
Due Process Clause is to serve any useful purpose, there must be some factual
dispute.”301 That case concerned a dispute between an employer and a terminated
employee.302 The employee was terminated from a police department after putting
a revolver to his head in a suicide attempt as a trainee.303 The Court found that be-
cause the employee did not claim the suicide attempt was false, there was no reason
290 Washington v. Trump (Washington II ), 847 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017) (per
curiam) (order denying stay of District Court’s TRO).
291 Id.
292 Id. at 1158–59.
293 Id. at 1161–62.
294 Id. at 1164.
295 Id. (citing Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1203 (9th Cir. 2012)).
296 Id. (quoting United Sates v. Raya-Vaca, 771 F.3d 1195, 1204 (9th Cir. 2014)).
297 Id.
298 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
299 Washington II, 847 F.3d at 1164 (citing Raya-Vaca, 771 F.3d at 1204 (“Due process
always requires, at a minimum, notice and an opportunity to respond.”)).
300 429 U.S. 624 (1977).
301 Id. at 627.
302 Id. at 626.
303 Id.
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to have a hearing to discuss the matter.304 The fact that the employee never alleged
falsity was thus “fatal to [his] claim under the Due Process Clause that he should
have been given a hearing.”305 Later, the Supreme Court went on to the similar case
of Loudermill, which concerned a security guard’s termination based on dishonesty
in his employment application.306 He stated on his application that he had never been
convicted of a felony but the Board later found that he had previously been con-
victed of grand larceny.307 Loudermill rejoined that he thought the larceny convic-
tion was a misdemeanor and not a felony.308 The Court noted that “some opportunity
for the employee to present his side of the case is recurringly of obvious value in
reaching an accurate decision.”309 However, “[e]ven where the facts are clear, the
appropriateness or necessity of the discharge may not be; in such cases, the only
meaningful opportunity to invoke the discretion of the decisionmaker is likely to be
before the termination takes effect.”310 Reading these cases together, as Loudermill
did not overrule Codd, even when the due process rubric is applied, the result may not
be a hearing if discrepancy and discretion are not relevant elements.311
The Ninth Circuit argued that the “Government has not shown that the Execu-
tive Order provides what due process requires, such as notice and a hearing prior to
restricting an individual’s ability to travel.”312 The court does not elaborate on how
an individual’s ability to travel, standing alone, would trigger a due process consid-
eration.313 Nor does it identify any contours as to what might be constitutionally
required to meet any procedural due process requirements.314 It is important to note
that nowhere in the relevant case law has the Supreme Court ever identified a “right to
travel” as a liberty interest that triggers due process considerations.315 The Ninth Circuit
provides no citations for the proposition that this right exists when applied to aliens.316
In evaluating the likelihood of success on the merits of the procedural due pro-
cess claim, the court points to three violations that Washington and Minnesota
304 Id. at 626–27.
305 Id. at 624.
306 470 U.S. 532, 535 (1985).
307 Id.
308 Id.
309 Id. at 543.
310 Id. (emphasis added).
311 See supra notes 300–09 and accompanying text.
312 Washington v. Trump (Washington II ), 847 F.3d 1151, 1164 (9th Cir. 2017) (per
curiam) (order denying stay of District Court’s TRO).
313 Id. at 1163–64 (discussing, without detail, the power of court to adjudicate executive
action challenges which allegedly encroach on individuals’ constitutional rights).
314 Id. at 1165 (concluding “[t]he Government has provided no affirmative argument
showing that the States’ procedural due process claims fail as to these categories of aliens”).
315 See Sheldon Elliot Steinbach, Constitutional Protection for Freedom of Movement: A
Time for Decision, 57 KY. L.J. 417, 434 (1969) (discussing the sparse history of the “Right
to Travel” in Supreme Court jurisprudence).
316 See generally Washington II, 847 F.3d 1151.
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identified.317 First, the Order denied re-entry to certain LPRs and non-immigrant
visaholders without notice and an opportunity to respond.318 Second, the Order
prohibited certain LPRs and non-immigrant visaholders from exercising a constitu-
tionally protected interest in traveling abroad and re-entering the United States.319
Third, the Order did not allow for the statutory procedures already in place that al-
lowed incoming aliens to request application for asylum and other related relief in
the United States.320 The court acknowledged that the district court had held success
on each of these claims was likely without “discussing or offering analysis as to any
specific alleged violation.”321
The first and second violations are conflated—to establish an appropriate pro-
cedural due process claim one must first identify an individualized decision from a
government actor that is depriving a protected interest, and then contend for certain
pieces of process to be constitutionally required. Therefore, first, the LPRs and non-
immigrant visaholders would have to establish that they had a constitutionally pro-
tected interest, and second, that they were being denied process in protection of that
interest.322 The framing of the issues by the States and the court also collapses two
groups (LPRs and non-immigrant visa holders) into one larger group, even though
the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that these two groups receive different amounts
of process.323 The third point is not linked to constitutional process, but rather the
statutory process that is already embedded in admission.324 The INA provides that,
“[a]ny alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the
United States . . . irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply for asylum.”325 The
Executive Order does not address what changes it makes to the statutory scheme.326
The Ninth Circuit asserts that procedural protections apply to all persons within
the United States regardless of status, and to certain aliens attempting to reenter the
United States after traveling abroad.327 The compounding of these two concepts
317 Id. at 1165.
318 Id.
319 Id.
320 Id. The Executive Order suspends the United States Refugee Admission Program, but
does not say anything about how arriving aliens from the countries of concern are supposed
to request asylum, should they wish to do so. Even in cases of expedited removal with no
hearing, the INA still allows a valve for asylum application. See Exec. Order No. 13769, 82
Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).
321 Washington II, 847 F.3d at 1165.
322 Cf. id. at 1165 (discussing the two separate issues in a conflated matter).
323 See Morawetz, supra note 59, at 202, 223.
324 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2012) (mandating a statutory right to apply for asylum).
325 Id. This subsection also implicates possible relief under INA § 235(b), the expedited
removal section. Section 235 provides that an alien cannot be removed without further in-
vestigation if the alien wishes to apply for asylum or claims he will be persecuted if returned
to his home country. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Other relief, such as non-refoulement and
protection against torture is also found in the statute. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012).
326 See generally Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
327 Washington II, 847 F.3d at 1165 (per curiam) (order denying stay of District Court’s
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together suggests again that the phrase “within the United States” mentioned in
Zadvydas is perhaps a territorial demarcation that also revolves around whether an
alien has properly entered (or been admitted to) the United States.328 Otherwise, it
would be unnecessary to separate the citations and add extraneously that certain aliens
reentering also received due process.329 Regarding LPRs, the court notes that the
government makes no argument that they are not entitled to due process or that the
Executive Order furnishes enough procedural protection to challenge a denial of
reentry.330 Again the court is forgetting that even if procedural due process could be
triggered for these aliens, fulfillment of that constitutional duty might amount to very
little. In Plasencia, a case cited by the court for this argument, the lowest possible
fulfillment of due process in same-day notice and hastily explained charges may have
been sufficient to satisfy the constitutional call.331 In addition, reading Codd 332 and
Loudermill333 together, there may be no factual dispute or discretionary issue (beyond
a waiver) that would require additional process.
The court stresses that aside from the LPR issue, other aliens might have proper
due process claims, including “non-immigrant visaholders who have been in the
United States but temporarily departed or wish to temporarily depart; refugees; and
applicants who have a relationship with a U.S. resident or an institution that might
have rights of its own to assert.”334 This is an odd grouping of potential classes.
While non-immigrant visaholders who have been properly admitted and are within
the United States might arguably have access to due process, mere applicants who
have not been admitted are on tenuous ground indeed. The court cited to Kerry v.
Din, but a divided Court in that case could not agree that marriage was sufficient
enough to trigger due process.335 Any alien who merely has a relationship with, for
example an employer, would have no due process argument.336 Nevertheless, the Ninth
Circuit asserts that the government has not shown Washington and Minnesota lack
viable claims in these categories.337
TRO) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S.
21, 33–34 (1982)).
328 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693.
329 Washington II, 847 F.3d at 1165.
330 Id. Part of the argument here continues on mootness grounds, where the government
claims that authoritative guidance restricted the application of the order to LPRs. Id. at 1162.
However, the court was unconvinced that the wrongful behavior would not reasonably be
expected to recur. Id. at 1166 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc.,
528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)).
331 See Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 22.
332 429 U.S. 624 (1977).
333 470 U.S. 532 (1985).




96 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:65
The court then moved on and discussed the breadth of the TRO and the govern-
ment’s contention that it was overbroad because it extended nationwide and covered
more than LPRs.338 The court declined to limit the geographical scope of the order
and chose not to “rewrite the Executive Order” even if doing so may have been
desirable, given the “nation’s multiple ports of entry and interconnected transit
system.”339 More importantly to the due process point, the court also refused to limit
the scope of the Order to LPRs or even to previously admitted aliens.340 The court
based its reasoning on two points: the assertion from the Supreme Court in Zadvydas
that aliens unlawfully in the United States have due process rights341 and the concur-
rence and dissent from Din, in which “six Justices declin[ed] to adopt a rule that
would categorically bar U.S. citizens from asserting cognizable liberty interests in
the receipt of visas by alien spouses.”342 The court arguably misrepresents Din, as
the concurrence in that case found no need to decide the protected interest issue,
partially for national security reasons and partially because due process was satisfied
in that case.343 Although the court conceded that there might be persons covered by
the TRO who did not have due process claims, the government’s revision was in
error because it left out some persons who did have such claims.344 Aside from the
procedural due process inquiry, the court also addressed the likelihood of success
on a religious discrimination claim,345 the balance of hardships,346 and the public
interest at issue in the case in order to deny the stay of the TRO.347
Executive Order 13780 superseded Executive Order 13769 and the Ninth Circuit
granted the government’s unopposed motion to dismiss its underlying appeal.348
However, no party moved to vacate the Order, and a judge called for a vote to
determine if the court should grant en banc reconsideration of the Order.349 This vote
failed to receive support from a majority of Ninth Circuit judges, and the order de-
nying the stay remained in place.350 Judge Bybee dissented from the denial of en
banc reconsideration and was joined by Judges Kozinski, Callahan, Bea, and Ikuta.351
338 Id.
339 Id. at 1167.
340 Id. at 1166.
341 Id. at 1165.
342 Id. at 1166.
343 Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2139 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
344 Washington II, 847 F.3d at 1166.
345 Id. at 1167–68.
346 Id. at 1168–69.
347 Id.
348 Washington v. Trump (Washington IV ), No. 17-35105, 2017 WL 3774041 (9th Cir.
Mar. 8, 2017) (order granting Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss).
349 Washington v. Trump (Washington III ), 858 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017) (order denying
vacatur of stay order).
350 Id.
351 Id. at 1174 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
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The dissent focused not on the due process issue specifically, but rather on the
“fundamental error” the court made in ignoring a mandate of deference to the judg-
ment of the political branches.352 Bybee contended that the Supreme Court had said,
“plainly and often” that such deference was necessary in matters of immigration
policy.353 He stressed the repeated use by other presidents of Section 1182(f) to bar
the entry of broad classes of aliens from identified countries.354 The only way for the
court to address the “knotty questions” of reviewing constitutional challenges to
executive action in light of this deference was to “distinguish between two groups
of aliens: those who are present within our borders and those who are seeking admis-
sion.”355 In his opinion, Bybee stated, “[t]he panel did not recognize that critical dis-
tinction and it led to manifest error.”356 The court should have followed the test set
forth in Klieindienst and held that “[o]nce the executive makes a decision ‘on the
basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason,’ the courts may ‘neither look
behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against’
the constitutional interests . . . [the] denial might implicate.”357 In fact, marshalling the
case law of Mandel,358 Fiallo,359 and Din,360 and the history of this case law in applica-
tion to the post-9/11 registration program, the dissent argued that these cases are
“devastating to the panel’s conclusion that we can simply apply ordinary consti-
tutional standards to immigration policy.”361 Ordinary constitutional application
simply would not do in a case where due process does not apply, but amplified def-
erence does.362
Executive Order 13780, entitled “Executive Order Protecting the Nation From
Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,” itself noted that Executive Order 13769
had been “delayed by litigation.”363 Therefore, the Order restated its purpose, citing
from the Department of State’s Country Reports on Terrorism, to detail country con-
ditions to “demonstrate why their nationals continue to present heightened risks to
the security of the United States.”364 In light of the litigation, the President revoked
Executive Order 13769 and replaced it with Executive Order 13780, which allegedly
“expressly excludes from the suspensions categories of aliens that have prompted
judicial concerns and which clarifies or refines the approach to certain other issues or
352 Id. at 1177.
353 Id. at 1178.
354 Id. at 1176 (internal citations omitted).
355 Id. at 1178.
356 Id. at 1179.
357 Id. at 1181 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972)).
358 Kleindienst, 408 U.S. 753.
359 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
360 Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015).
361 Washington III, 858 F.3d at 1182 (Bybee, J., dissenting).
362 Id. at 1178, 1181.
363 Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 § 1(c) (Mar. 6, 2017).
364 Id. § 1(e).
98 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:65
categories of affected aliens.”365 The suspensions only applied to foreign nationals who
were outside the United States on the effective date of the Order, did not have a valid
visa on January 27, 2017, and who still did not have a valid visa on March 16, 2017.366
The Order also provided several categories of exemption, including LPRs and asylees
already admitted to the United States.367 A severability section was also included to
allow the Order to remain in place even if portions were held to be invalid.368
CONCLUSION
Was the Ninth Circuit right about the probability of success the States would have
had regarding their due process claims? Although the statement in Zadvydas seems
clear in that all aliens are entitled to due process, it did not overrule or reconcile
conflicting pieces of case law which seem to suggest there are situations in which
that is not the case.369 Certainly there is merit to the idea that LPRs have a continued
interest in their status that may be protected, but non-immigrant visa holders and
applicants for entry do not. Even if these aliens could establish something akin to
a “right to travel” and convince the Supreme Court to recognize this right as a pro-
tected interest embedded in history and essential to the concept of ordered liberty,
that may not be enough.370 To win the fight for due process to be applied to these
aliens means only that the next phase of the formula is calculated. What due process
requires is infinitely flexible, and at its core requires a base of only notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard. Mathews requires the weighing of interests.371 But the Department
of Justice, in charge of removal hearings and their appeals, has even questioned
“whether Mathews is the appropriate touchstone in light of the unique nature of the
[Immigration & Nationality] Act as the tool for managing the intersection of foreign
and domestic interests regarding aliens.”372
It remains to be seen whether aliens may even argue a concrete protected in-
terest in this case, but any interest an alien can assert will be diminished the closer
he or she is to being considered merely an arriving alien. The government’s interest
in protecting national security is strong and the risk of erroneous deprivation seems
slight—all a border official must do is determine whether an arriving alien hails
from one of these countries or is entering as a refugee. The original Executive Order
did not seem facially to allow for the asylum procedures required by the INA, or an
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appeal, if factually it was disputed from where an alien had arrived. But given the
tendency of the Court to avoid unconstitutional interpretations, it is not unthinkable
that the Court would “infer” these reasonable measures from the text of the order,
much like the six month time period it invented for Zadvydas.373 Every analysis of
process due to aliens begins and ends with a benediction of Congress’s authority that
is helplessly entwined with Executive discretion and primacy.
What is perhaps most striking in the recount of power is how intermixed the
legislative and executive branches are in this area.374 Where, as here, Congress has
specifically delegated a large swath of its even larger power to admit aliens to the
President,375 finding a restriction on due process grounds alone may be untenable.
Congress has allowed the President to suspend the entry of any aliens or all aliens
or impose whatever restrictions he wishes for whatever time period he wishes, as
long as he finds that their entry would be “detrimental to the interests of the United
States.”376 The language of the INA even suggests that these types of decisions may
be committed to agency discretion by law and thus unreviewable beyond a constitu-
tional lens.377 President Trump may be right, or right enough, in this case to over-
come a constitutional challenge. The answer may never be articulated by the Supreme
Court since the government has withdrawn its challenge of the TRO in favor of a
new Executive Order on the matter.378 However, Executive Order 13769 and the
Ninth Circuit’s response allows a scholarly review of procedural due process in the
immigration context and a plea that the floor may be too low in this arena. National
security and the natural and constitutionally enforced separation of powers must be
considered, but procedure is still important. Justice Jackson, dissenting in the Mezei
case, said, “[o]nly the untaught layman or the charlatan lawyer can answer that
procedures matter not. Procedural fairness and regularity are of the indispensable
essence of liberty. . . . [D]ifferences in the process of administration make all the
difference between a reign of terror and one of law.”379
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